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This paper concerns the implications of biased beliefs on entrepreneurial earnings. Amongst 
self-employed business owners, income is decreasing in optimism measured whilst still an 
employee. Controlling for earnings in paid employment, self-employment earnings of those 
with optimism above the mean are some 30% less than those with optimism below the mean. 
For employees, it is optimists that have higher earnings. These and associated results suggest 
that mistaken expectations lead to entry errors. As a test of external validity, future divorcees 
turn out to be financial optimists, indicating our measure captures an intrinsic psychological 
trait associated with rash decisions. 
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“What wild imaginations one forms where dear self is concerned! How sure to be mistaken!” 
Jane Austen 
“The first principle is that you must not fool yourself and you are the easiest person to fool.” 
Richard P. Feynman 
1. Introduction 
A common theme of self-help books, exemplified by Norman Vincent Peale’s 
influential “The Power of Positive Thinking” (1952), is “When you expect the best, you release 
a magnetic force in your mind which by a law of attraction tends to bring the best to you.”1 
There is now considerable evidence that beliefs matter for performance. Some of the studies 
are summarised in Compte and Postlewaite (2004), who argue that biased expectations may 
therefore be optimal. Nevertheless, there is a downside. Incorrect forecasts tend to result in 
mistaken decisions and hence worse outcomes. Self-belief may enhance performance but also 
result in participation in activities doomed to failure. 
This paper examines how these forces play out in start-ups, a big decision with many 
uncertainties. Optimists overweight the upside, and so tend to self-select into self-employment, 
as an increasing number of studies find.2 More optimistic individuals may mistakenly think 
they have identified good opportunities and, therefore, tend to switch too soon and into 
objectively poor projects.3 These are reasons why optimism may be associated with lower self-
employment earnings. Nevertheless, if Hamlet is right and “..thinking makes it so.”, optimists 
may outperform.  
The main finding is that prior optimism is negatively associated with the subsequent 
earnings of the self-employed. Controlling for earnings as an employee, self-employed 
                                                          
1 Peale was Donald Trump’s childhood pastor. 
2 For example, Arabsheibani et al. (2000), Cassar (2010), Puri and Robinson (2007, 2013) and Dawson et al. 
(2014). 
3 The reasoning is that of de Meza and Southey (1996), Camerer and Lovello (1999) and Malmendier and Tate 
(2008) for why optimistic CEOs are more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions. Optimism has other 
implications for entrepreneurship such as a preference for debt (de Meza and Southey (1996) tested by Landier 
and Thesmar (2009)). 
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pessimists earn some 30% more than optimists. In contrast, amongst employees, optimists earn 
more.4 Entrepreneurial optimism implies that as far as private returns are concerned, entry into 
entrepreneurship is sometimes mistaken. This is a reason for caution in adopting policies that 
encourage start-ups. Our results provide tentative support that optimism does actually matter 
in this regard. 
Two other papers look at how aspects of preferences affect entry into self-employment 
and subsequent earnings. In Hvide and Panos (2013), the taste parameter is risk preference, 
proxied by stock market participation and personal leverage. According to reduced form 
estimates, risk tolerance encourages entry but depresses earnings. The interpretation is a 
selection effect, that more risk tolerant types accept lower expected return projects. Hamilton 
et al. (2014) study the effect of the “big five” personality traits. Personality potentially affects 
relative earning power in paid and self-employment, as well as relative non-pecuniary 
attraction. A structural model is estimated using simulated maximum likelihood to identify 
these selection and treatment effects. Self-employment is found to be attractive to those open 
to new experience but lowers its expected financial returns. According to the model, the sign 
of selection and treatment effects on earnings is the same. Both of these papers invoke rational 
expectations. In our case, the effect of forecast bias is investigated. Unlike the other papers, 
where the explanatory variables are preference based, systematic error implies a potential case 
for policy intervention to offset the bias. 
Hurst and Pugsley (2011) document that most businesses start small, remain small and 
do not innovate. This suits most owners, since the most common reason given for starting a 
                                                          
4 There is evidence that the economic return to self-employment is low. According to Hamilton (2000), the median 
self-employed worker earns less than they would as an employee. Similarly, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgenson 
(2002) find that the return on the equity invested in private businesses does not compensate for the risk involved. 
Levine and Rubinstein (2017) find that owners of incorporated businesses increase their gross earnings relative to 
paid employment. It is unincorporated businesses that do worse. Åstebro et al. (2013) find that sole proprietors 
suffer large income falls relative to their employee earnings. Optimism is a possible explanation for low earnings 
along with underreporting to evade tax (Astebo and Chen, 2014), preference for autonomy (Hurst, Li and Pugsley, 
2014) and rational experimentation (Kerr et al., 2014). Åstebro et al. (2015) find some experimental evidence of 
skewness loving, possibly because large prizes are the most salient. 
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business is desire for autonomy. If start-ups mostly represent “lifestyle” choices, it is argued 
that they create few positive externalities and therefore explicit and implicit subsidies should 
be eliminated. This conclusion is reinforced by overexpansion of self-employment due to 
opportunities for tax evasion and avoidance and the non-taxability of non-pecuniary benefits, 
explored in Hurst and Pugsley (2016). Although many of those setting up businesses may be 
knowingly foregoing expected income, our paper provides evidence that the fall in income is 
systematically underestimated. The implication is that if expectations were rational, there 
would be fewer start-ups.   
The next section sets out the analytical issues. Section 3 describes the data and discusses 
the implementation of the method. Results follow in Section 4. As a test of the robustness, 
Section 5 examines whether financial optimists make rash decisions in other spheres. Optimists 
are more likely to make poor marriage matches resulting in divorce and to be heavy smokers. 
Finally, brief conclusions are drawn. 
 
2. Optimism and Earnings: Theory 
 
 This section provides the theoretical underpinning for the empirical finding that the sign 
of the optimism effect on earnings of the self-employed is more negative than its effect on 
employees. As optimists are also more likely to be self-employed, this cannot easily be 
reconciled with the first observation if the optimism measure merely proxies for some 
unobserved productivity attribute. The analysis is developed in two steps. First, the pure 
selection effects on intrinsic optimism are established. Then the complications arising when 
optimism is estimated as forecast error are addressed. 
Entry into self-employment can be considered as a choice based on perceived 
comparative advantage. In the spirit of Lazear (2004), suppose earnings in both paid and self-
employment depends on unobserved entrepreneurial ability, 𝑧, and an observed attribute, 𝑥. An 
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individual’s expected earnings in self-employment are 𝑤𝑠 = 𝑆(𝑧, 𝑥)  and in paid employment 
are 𝑤𝑝 = 𝑃(𝑧, 𝑥).
5 It is likely that 𝑧 has a smaller effect in paid employment. Assume that 
everyone starts out in paid employment, then has the opportunity to switch to self-employment. 
Also, for simplicity, that choices are made to maxmize expected earnings. As illustrated in 
Figure 1, under rational expectations, conditional on the observable taking value ?̅?, individuals 
with 𝑧 above 𝑧𝑟 become self-employed. Average earnings are higher in self-employment as the 
only reason to switch from paid employment is to boost earnings.  
Optimists overestimate returns in self-employment relative to paid employment.6 
Specifically, setting up a business gives more scope for optimism than continuing as an 
employee, as proposed by de Meza and Southey (1996). Evidence that the self-employed are 
indeed more optimistic than employees is provided by, amongst others, Arabsheibani et al. 
(2001), Puri and Robinson (2007, 2013) and Åstebro et al. (2007). Dawson et al. (2014) find 
that optimism predates self-employment but is increased by self-employment. 
For now, suppose that there are just two types of expectation: rational or optimistic. 
The perceived returns of an optimist in self-employment are 𝑤𝑠 = 𝑂 + 𝑆(𝑧, 𝑥) with 𝑂 > 0.
7 
What matters is that optimism makes self-employment attractive relative to paid employment. 
For simplicity, it will be assumed that optimism does not affect perception of returns in paid 
                                                          
5 This formulation assumes that returns do not depend on the numbers choosing each option. For example, if more 
restaurants are opened, this may depress returns to all, as in de Meza and Southey (1996). As this paper is 
concerned with the effect of individual differences in optimism this crowding effect can be ignored.  
6 Usage is not settled. Many economists (e.g. Hvide, 2002), including us, consider optimism to be a self-serving 
bias in an estimate whilst excessive precision in the estimate (an overly narrow confidence interval) is 
overconfidence. Overconfidence sometimes covers both meanings. For some optimism is sometimes reserved for 
bias in the estimation of own ability as opposed to of favourable external events. Bengtsson and Ekeblom (2014) 
find that in Sweden, the self-employed are more optimistic about macro-economic variables than employees. 
Psychologists typically do not regard optimism as a forecast error but an upbeat attitude or a belief that good 
things will happen (as in the LOT-R general optimism inventory). For some individuals, this is a rational 
expectation, in which case they are not optimists in the sense of making self-serving errors. Moore and Healy 
(2008) (see also Astebro, Nande and Weber, 2014) distinguish between overestimation of the individuals own 
ability or performance, overplacement where individuals assess their ability rank too highly, and overprecision, 
excessively narrow confidence intervals (overconfidence in terms of the previous footnote). Astebro, Jeffrey,and 
Adomdza (2007) find evidence that inventor-entrepreneurs exhibit greater overestimation than the general 
population over performance in general knowledge testing as well as in LOT-R style general optimism. 
7 Whether the optimism boost is additive, multiplicative or some other form is immaterial for what follows. 
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employment at all. In Figure 1, the threshold for an optimist to enter self-employment is 𝑧𝑜 <
𝑧𝑟. If the distribution of 𝑧 is the same for optimists and realists, controlling for observables, 
optimists are more likely to enter self-employment than realists but earn less on average.8 
It is possible that the distribution of 𝑧 is different for optimists and realists. Suppose, 
for example, the 𝑧 distribution of optimists is shifted to the right relative to realists. This 
augments the tendency for optimists to enter self-employment, but tempers the tendency for 
optimists to earn less. The combination of high entry into self-employment and low earnings 
is unlikely to be generated by omitted-variable bias. 
  
 
Figure 1: Selection in to self-employment 
In bringing the model to the data, the complication is that optimism is not directly observed but 
estimated from earlier earnings forecast error. This has the advantage of directly concerning 
                                                          
8 An extension to the model is that the self-employment opportunity available to an individual may be the result 
of a stochastic draw. The individual’s unobserved project quality can be included in the 𝑆 function. Optimism 
now concerns project quality as well as own attributes but the implications are the same. 
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the relevant bias, but as earnings are a component of optimism, care must be taken to ensure 
that any relationship is not purely mechanical. Optimism is therefore measured in periods 
before its effects are estimated. Even so, the effects of measurement error must be accounted 
for. Unlucky income realizations raise measured optimism, but if the shock is transitory, 
optimism will be associated with higher future earnings, or unchanged future earnings if the 
shock is permanent. Measurement error is the only way optimism affects the earnings of those 
continuing in paid employment, and, as such, its coefficient will tend to be positive. In self-
employment, the selection effect offsets measurement error, so the overall optimism effect 
could be negative. 
 
Making these points more formally, the effect of optimism on forecast is 
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑂𝑖                                              (1) 
where the forecast is for period 𝑡 made at 𝑡 − 1 knowing the employment mode at 𝑡. 𝑂𝑖 is 
intrinsic optimism. Realized earnings are 
𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 +  𝑝𝑖𝑡                      (2) 
where 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is a transitory income shock and 𝑝𝑖𝑡 is a permanent shock. Measured optimism, as 
distinct from intrinsic optimism, is 
                 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 − 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝑂𝑖 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡−𝑝𝑖𝑡           (3) 
For an individual remaining in paid employment, rationally expected earnings only differ in 
each period by the income shocks,9 so from (1), (2) and (3) 
𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑝𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑝𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝑝𝑖𝑡      (4) 
                                                          
9 It is possible that as careers develop some characteristics play different roles. In that case the effect of unobserved 
variables may not be perfectly captured by first-period earnings. 
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The earnings equation (4) is the basis for empirical estimation. Realized earnings are 
observable, as is measured optimism. Intrinsic optimism is not observable, but as it is a 
component of measured optimism with opposite sign to its direct appearance in the equation, 
its magnitude has no influence on earnings. The same is true of permanent shocks.10 However, 
measured optimism is decreasing in lagged transitory shocks, which do not otherwise appear 
in (4). For employees, future earnings are therefore increasing in past, measured optimism. 
This is not due to selection effects but measurement error. There is no selection effect because 
the unobserved variables that influence earnings in 𝑡 had the same effect at 𝑡 − 1, so are 
effectively controlled for in the future earnings equation. This is not the case for the self-
employment earnings equation because the unobservables play a different role in the two 
modes.  
 
For those moving in to self-employment, 
𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑓(?̅?, 𝑂𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑝𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑂𝑖 + 𝑓(𝑧𝑖, ?̅?, 𝑂𝑖)+𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑝𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑝𝑖𝑡−1               (5) 
In the first expression of (5), the rational expectation is for earnings at 𝑡 − 1 when the 
individual is still in paid employment. To obtain self-employment earnings at 𝑡, an adjustment 
must be made to take into account that individuals earning the same in paid employment are 
differentially suited to self-employment. The extent to which adjustment is needed depends on 
the individual’s 𝑧. This is unobservable, but due to selection the mean value of 𝑧 is decreasing 
in optimism. Hence the adjustment function, 𝑓(?̅?, 𝑂𝑖).  
 
                                                          
10 As in Gervais and O'Dean (2001), it may take time to adjust to a negative permanent shock during which time 
optimism prevails.    
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The properties of (5) with respect to measured optimism depend on the reason for variation. If 
measured optimism is high due to a transitory shock at 𝑡 − 1, earnings will be higher at 𝑡, just 
as in the paid employment earnings function, (4). Higher 𝑂𝑖 raises measured optimism but the 
earnings effect is no longer exactly cancelled out due to the 𝑓(?̅?, 𝑂𝑖) term which imparts a 
negative effect. 
 
The analysis has so far assumed that intrinsic optimism does not have a direct 
productivity effect. This is not necessarily the case. Incorrect expectations may mean that 
optimists take poor operating decisions, which may be particularly important for those running 
their own business. Optimism may also have positive effects. For example, as argued by Trivers 
(2000), optimism may have evolved to influence others. The best way to convince others of 
your competence is really to believe in it yourself. Self-deception begets effective deception. 
Some evidence of this role is provided by Adomdza et al. (2016) and Schwardmann and Van 
der Weele (2016). For employees, the target of influence is most obviously the boss, but could 
include customers or suppliers. The latter two influences are also potentially relevant for the 
self-employed, as is the ability to persuade financiers. Effort choice may also be affected by 
optimism.11 In principle, the effect could run in either direction. Optimists may apply more 
effort because they overestimate its marginal effectiveness or decrease effort because they 
believe that even with low effort success is assured, albeit with decreasing marginal returns.12 
For those remaining in paid employment, any productivity effects of optimism will be reflected 
in first period earnings. Given the second-period earnings function has first-period earnings as 
a control, it remains true that optimism only figures as a result of transitory shocks. As the 
productivity effect of optimism may be different in self-employment and paid employment, it 
                                                          
11 In the empirical work it is possible to control for variation in hours. 
12 Moscarini and Fang (2005) show that if optimism is good for incentives, employers may be better off 
preserving illusions by not tailoring offers to individual productivity. That is, optimism may lead to wage 
compression.  
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may not be neutral in the self-employment earnings function. Denote self-employment earnings 
of an optimist as 𝑤𝑠 = 𝑆(𝑧, 𝑥, 𝑂). In Figure 1, the earnings schedule of the optimistic self-
employed is now distinct from the realistic. This will move the propensity to enter and earnings 
of optimists in opposite directions. Whatever the outcome, optimism still leads to excess entry. 
 
In summary, the equilibrium relationships implied by self-selection and the optimism 
measure are as follows; 
1. The optimism coefficient in the paid employment earnings function will be positive. 
2. In the self-employment earnings function, the optimism coefficient will be lower than 
in paid employment and may be negative if selection effects are strong enough. 
3. Optimists are more likely to be self-employed. 
 
3. Data source and methods 
In outline, the method is to use the initial years of a large and long panel dataset, which 
includes forecasts and realizations, to estimate individual optimism and earnings capability in 
paid employment. Subsequent years of data are then used to determine how optimism impacts 
earnings controlling for past earnings and realizations.  
 
 
3.1. The BHPS survey instrument 
The data source for the analysis is the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), a 
nationally representative longitudinal survey initiated in 1991 and funded by the UK Economic 
and Social Research Council as an internationally comparative multi-purpose research 
resource. A stratified random cluster sample of households, drawn from the population of 
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British household postal addresses in Great Britain, is tracked annually.13 Each wave includes 
household and individual questionnaire instruments, the latter completed separately by all adult 
household members present at each wave. Follow-on rules ensure the tracking of any newly 
formed households involving originally enumerated household members. The individual 
instrument covers a range of topics including demographic characteristics, economic activity, 
and finances, and includes some recall items on family background, education and employment 
history. The original sample of approximately 5000 households (comprising around 12000 
individuals) was recruited in 1991. This study uses data from 18 annual waves available 
between 1991 and 2008.14  
The BHPS survey design has evolved to incorporate a number of regional boosts, 
however the sample used in the analysis is restricted to the originally enumerated sample across 
Great Britain (i.e. excluding Northern Ireland), and to those individuals who are either in paid 
employment or self-employed. Self-employed is defined here as those who self-identify as self-
employed business owners. This is checked by the interviewer against their UK tax status, 
under which those who declare themselves to be self-employed are responsible for own income 
tax declarations and payments, rather than directly through employer-made deductions. 
Freelancers and subcontractors who may be self-employed for tax purposes but are not business 
owners are excluded from the definition and the analysis, drawing on information in a 
questionnaire item about the nature of the self-employment. This leaves approximately 80% of 
the self-employed who are business owners.  
                                                          
13 The far north of Scotland is excluded because of the prohibitive sampling costs. The original survey excludes 
Northern Ireland. Booster samples for Wales and Scotland recruited in 1999 and a sample for Northern Ireland 
recruited in 2001 are excluded from the analysis. 
14 Sample attrition rates in the BHPS are generally low and certainly comparable to those achieved in other similar 
household panels. As is typical with household panels the highest attrition rate of individuals was between Waves 
1 and 2 (12%). Attrition between Waves 2 and 3 was 7% of the original individuals and subsequently averaged 
2.4% of the original sample between waves. In common with nearly all previously published research using this 
data source, attrition is assumed to be a random event. From 2009 onwards the BHPS sample has been merged 
into a much larger new longitudinal household study with further widening of scope, including biosocial analysis. 
However, some reductions in questionnaire detail yields the larger dataset unsuitable for the present analysis. 
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3.2. Defining and measuring intrinsic optimism 
In establishing the relationship between optimism and earnings, the first step is to 
construct a measure of optimism defined as an excessive belief in the probability of good 
financial realizations. The measure of optimism is forecast error, the challenge being to 
separate systematic bias (intrinsic optimism) from random error. Positive (negative) errors may 
just reflect bad (good) luck. A further issue is that bias may depend on what it is that is being 
forecast. Optimism is greater when individuals believe events are under their control (e.g. 
Harris, 1996)15 and when the task is difficult (Lichtenstein and Fischoff, 1977).16 Ideally, the 
forecasting task should be reasonably uniform across individuals and similar to that in the 
setting of study. 
The optimism measure is constructed from two questionnaire items on financial 
expectations and realizations, asked of all individuals in each year. The first is: 
 
“Looking ahead, how do you think you yourself will be financially a year from now; 
better than you are now, worse than you are now, or about the same?”  
Individuals who gave a valid response at year t are then matched with their self-reported 
financial realization at year t+1, obtained from the second question:  
“Would you say that you yourself are better off, worse off or about the same financially 
than you were a year ago?”  
The survey instrument asks for responses to both questions on three-point scales. So 
the empirical approach set out in section 2 must be adapted to the categorical nature of these 
                                                          
15 The “illusion of control” (Langer, 1975) is the excessive belief that an individual can influence events.  
16 Starting a business normally involves both characteristics. 
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forecast and realization data. To measure optimism from data of this type we follow Das and 
van Soest (1997), Arabsheibani et al. (2000), and Souleles (2004) in constructing a five-point 
measure of forecast error, defined as the difference between the financial forecast (of t+1) at t, 
minus the financial realization at t+1.17 As our optimism measure is based on financial forecast 
error, to determine the influence of optimism on earnings there must be no overlap in the time 
periods covered by these variables. For instance, in a cross-sectional approach, random 
negative shocks occurring after the forecast is made mechanically imply optimism and earnings 
are negatively correlated. To eliminate this concern, optimism is computed for two groups of 
individuals who will be referred to throughout the analysis as futures and nevers. Futures are 
those currently in paid-employment who become self-employed later in the panel. For this 
group, the optimism measure is computed over their period of paid employment prior to entry 
into self-employment. Data for the year prior to transition into self-employment is excluded as 
forecasts may be associated with unusually low financial outcomes if the switch to self-
employment was occasioned by involuntary severance from paid employment, and therefore 
not anticipated. Nevers are those who remain as employees over the full period covered by the 
dataset. For this group, optimism is computed over the first half of available years in paid-
employment (specifically the next highest integer to the midpoint number of years).18  
The categorical nature of the data is a drawback, but the longitudinal feature is an 
advantage since it allows more precision in identifying intrinsic optimism. Averaged over a 
number of periods, the noise in the optimism measure will be diminished though not completely 
                                                          
17 This procedure involves cardinalization of the forecast error. For example, forecasting better and achieving 
same is treated as equivalent to forecasting same and achieving worse. Although the five-point scale is commonly 
used, there is no fundamental defence of the procedure beyond saying it represents a convenient mapping from 
continuous but unobserved underlying forecasts and realizations. If the specification is wrong, it will make it 
harder to find optimism effects. 
18 A transition into self-employed business ownership is defined to have occurred if an individual’s full-time or 
main economic status changes to that state. A small number of transitions into part-time self-employment 
alongside full-time or part-time paid employment are excluded from the self-employed. Only the first spells of 
paid and self-employment are included in our sample. Few individuals start in self-employment and they are 
excluded.  
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eliminated. To take advantage of this property, a linear fixed-effect regression is estimated for 
all those in the sample as follows: 
𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝐵 + ?̂?𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                         (6) 
where Mit is the forecast error by individual i at time t. 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′  is a vector of time-varying 
demographic and other person-specific characteristics of individual i, as well as region and 
year dummy variables. For futures the observations are for the period in paid employment, and 
for nevers it is the first half of the period for which they are observed. The individual fixed 
effects in this regression, ?̂?𝑖  ,are extracted to provide estimates of intrinsic optimism net of any 
environmental influences from location and time and any changes to individual circumstance. 
These fixed effects are used as regressors in the second-phase earnings equation. 
Table A1 in the Appendix provides summary statistics for the nevers and futures in 
their first-phase when everyone is an employee. In total, there are 31,968 observations from 
7,985 individuals. Of these, there are 3,138 futures observations from 618 individuals. For 
nevers there are 28,830 observations from 7,367 individuals.  Intrinsic optimism is therefore 
constructed from an average of 5.1 observations per individual for futures and 3.9 observations 
per individual for nevers.  The average financial forecasts of futures exceed those of nevers, 
but average realizations are only marginally lower for futures. The forecast error is in the 
optimistic direction for both groups but futures are more optimistic than nevers.19  
 
The full estimate of equation (6), which provides the optimism estimates, is in Column 
1 of Table A2. It includes a range of demographic status, education and housing tenure status 
variables that might a priori be reasonably expected to influence financial forecasting or 
realizations. Although the controls are jointly significant, few are individually significant. The 
                                                          
19 Some nevers may enter self-employment later, in which case the tendency is to under record the extent of the 
optimism difference with futures. 
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fixed effects from this equation are our estimates of intrinsic optimism though it should be 
noted that using simple averages of forecast error yield similar second-stage results as to 
whether optimism is correlated with subsequent earnings in self-employment for futures and 
paid-employment for nevers.  
 
3.3 Earnings definition and measurement 
Gross monthly self-employment earnings are computed as follows. Approximately 
82% of self-employed business owners prepare annual accounts and so provide estimates of 
their share of profits (Table A4). Earnings data for the remainder are taken as the response to 
a supplementary question about pre-tax monthly self-employment earnings. The BHPS public 
release data file merges these into a single derived variable, measuring estimated monthly gross 
self-employment earnings. Annual loss data is available for the self-employed, but only for 
respondents who prepare annual accounts. For this reason, the single derived self-employment 
earnings variable sets earnings to zero for those whose annual reported profits are negative.20 
Because this treats the earnings distribution as left censored, a Tobit estimator is used in the 
earnings specification described in the next section. To allow for any systematic difference in 
measurement error between the two response types, the self-employed earnings regression 
includes dummy variables to control for data reporting method. For nevers, earnings are 
defined as gross monthly salary from main paid employment job. Table A4 reports the mean 
and percentiles for gross monthly earnings by employment status. These reveal that the paid-
employed have a relative advantage at the lower end of the distribution, but that above the 90th 
percentile the self-employed have a relative advantage. This earnings pattern will therefore 
appeal to optimists.  
 
                                                          
20 Incorporating the available negative earnings data does not materially affect any of the subsequent results. 
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3.4 Earnings equation specification 
The relationship between prior optimism and earnings is estimated by means of two 
earnings regressions. One is for the self-employed business owners who were previously 
futures and the other for nevers estimated over the second half of their employment period. 
Following equations (4) and (5), these take the form: 
𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 +  𝛼?̂?𝑖 +  𝛽𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖 +  𝛾𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗𝑧𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
(7) 
where  is gross monthly earnings and 𝑧𝑖𝑡 observable characteristics including age and hours 
of work and ?̂?𝑖 is the standardized fixed effect from the first-stage optimism equation.
21 To 
emphasize, there is no overlap in the periods over which the first-stage variables and  are 
measured. The primary interest is in the sign and significance of 𝛼. 
One potential criticism of the method is that, by construction, the optimism measure 
will tend to be negatively correlated with contemporaneous realizations and, to the extent that 
shocks are permanent, with future realizations and income. If expectations are not rational, ?̂?𝑖 
will act as a proxy for low underlying earning power and, therefore, be directly correlated with 
low earnings in the future. A negative association between ?̂?𝑖 and 𝐸𝑖𝑡 in equation (7) may 
simply reflect this effect rather than the influence of optimism on business start-up. To 
eliminate this possibility, when estimating the effect of optimism on earnings, two controls are 
included. The first, 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖, is the fixed-effect extracted from a linear realizations 
equation estimated for the same sample and period as for the optimism fixed effect, ?̂?𝑖. The 
estimated equation, which provide the optimism regressor, is reported in column 2 of Table A2 
in the Appendix. This procedure eliminates the impact of the optimism effect on earnings 
                                                          
21 Instead of (7), a fixed-effect equation for the earnings of futures can be estimated with the optimism measure 
(and other controls) interacted with a self-employment dummy. This formulation yields a negative differential 
effect of optimism which is significant at the 5% level. The effect of optimism on those remaining in paid 
employment cannot be captured by this procedure, only the differential effect. 
itE
itE
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simply arising due to extrapolation from past performance.22 Moreover, the categorical 
realization variable is not the only measure of past earnings power available. There is also the 
self-reported wage. In principle this ought to be a better measure of past individual labour 
market performance as it measures labour income rather than the individual’s perception of 
their overall financial situation. So a second control, 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖, is also used to eliminate 
any spurious optimism-earnings association. This is the individual fixed effect extracted from 
an hourly earnings regression estimated over the same period as ?̂?𝑖 and 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖. 
These fixed effects serve as a proxy measure of intrinsic earnings ability. Table A3 reports the 
earnings equation which provides this regressor. The estimated coefficients on key education, 
occupation and other labour market and employment characteristics conform to those in the 
huge body of past work on the determinants of earnings. 
The effect of past optimism on future earnings is thus measured and compared for 
individuals controlling for past earnings history, closing off the poor performance channel as 
the explanation of optimism effects. That this procedure succeeds in removing these 
mechanical effects is indicated by the fact that the relationship between optimism and earnings, 
as discussed in the next section, is found to be positive for nevers. This is consistent with 
recorded optimism sometimes reflecting bad luck. Individuals may make rational forecasts but, 
by chance, realizations are low, and so they appear in our data as optimists. Because of mean 
reversion these individuals should do better in the future. For futures this effect may still be 
present but now the effect of intrinsic optimism on entry more than offsets the rational 
expectations effect. 
Table A4 summarises the second-phase data used to model earnings. The self-employed 
earn significantly less than employees, although from Table A1, when still in paid employment 
                                                          
22 The greater the extent to which past realizations are due to permanent shocks, the lower might expectations be. 
Thus lower optimism implies worse performance, contrary to the self-employment finding. 
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futures earn significantly more than nevers. The self-employed are much more likely to be 
male, reflecting the lower proportion of women amongst the self-employed in the UK. The 
self-employed are less likely to hold university/college degrees than nevers but are more likely 
to have dependent children, to be home owners and married. Just over 18% of self-employed 
respondents report leaving compulsory schooling with no formal qualifications compared to 
16% of the employed. Home ownership and wealth has also been found to be correlated with 
self-employment activity consistent with a “collateral channel” (Black et al., 1996; Adelino et 
al., 2013; Kerr et al., 2015; Jensen et al., 2015, Schmalz et al., 2017 amongst others). As noted, 
high levels of home ownership are reported by the self-employed, with approximately 69% 
reporting a mortgage debt on their property. Labour market experience is captured through the 
inclusion of an employment tenure variable. On average the self-employed have nearly 4 years 
of employment tenure and nevers 5.7 years. For the self-employed, prior experience may, 
however, be provided indirectly through parental role models (Fairlie and Robb, 2007; 
Colombier and Masclet, 2008) as well as genetic factors (Lindquist et al., 2015). Parental 
business ownership experience is included as a control. Over three-quarters did not have a self-
employed parent, with 22% reporting that one or both parents were self-employed. The self-
employed also work just over nine hours longer per week than nevers.  
 
 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Selection into self-employment 
The first question is whether there is selection on optimism. Evidence in favour is that 
the respective mean standardized optimism scores for futures and nevers are 0.115 and -0.010, 
both measured whilst in paid employment, with the difference in means statistically significant 
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at the 1% level.23 Figure 2 displays the distributions of our measure of standardized optimism, 
?̂?𝑖,  for futures and nevers. It shows that futures are significantly more optimistic at all points 
on the lower three-quarters of the distribution.  
Figure 2: Distributions of standardized intrinsic optimism  
 
Note: There is a single optimism score per individual yielding a sample of 618 individuals for 
futures and 7367 individuals for nevers.  
 
A probit selection into self-employment equation for the combined sample of nevers 
and futures, is also estimated, using one observation per individual. This equation is reported 
in Table 1, where the dichotomous dependent variable takes on the value of one for individuals 
observed as futures and zero for individuals observed as nevers. Marginal effects are reported 
where characteristics are held constant at their respective mean values. Optimism is highly 
                                                          
23 The test of difference in means is bootstrapped to account for the fact that optimism (?̂?𝑖), is generated, rather 
than observed. 
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significant, consistent with previous research, notably Dawson et al. (2014). A one-point 
increase in the optimism measure is associated with a 1.3 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of future self-employment. This implies a 21% increase in the probability of future 
self-employment when evaluated as a one-point increase in optimism from the mean level of 
optimism in the sample.24 
Table 1: Optimism and selection into self-employment  
Dependent Variable  1 if Future, 0 if Never  
Estimator Probit 
Sample Cross section 
Variable Marginal Effect 
(std. err.) 
Standardized Optimism (?̂?𝑖) 0.013*** 
 (0.004) 
Past Earnings (𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖) 0.030*** 
 (0.004) 
Past Realizations (𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖) 0.013** 
 (0.004) 
Year of Birth 0.00001 
(0.0004) 
Male 0.037*** 
(0.002) 
Both parents self-employed 0.068*** 
(0.006) 
Father self-employed 0.026*** 
(0.003) 
Mother self-employed 0.022** 
(0.008) 
Observations  7,609 
Mean of Dependent variable 0.076 
Note: The estimated standard errors in parenthesis are bootstrapped to account for the fact that 
?̂?𝑖, 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖 and 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 are generated, rather than observed. A bootstrap 
procedure is used involving 500 repetitions which draws bootstrap samples (random samples 
                                                          
24 For robustness we also run the probit regression presented in Table 1 using all the available individual 
observations for our sample of futures and nevers. This equation includes the time invariant controls reported in 
Table 1 and a further barrage of time-varying controls. This procedure yields a marginal effect of approximately 
2 percentage points on our optimism variable. This equates with a 24% increase in the probability of future self-
employment when evaluated as a one-point increase in optimism from the mean level of optimism in the sample. 
This effect is statistically significant at the 5% level, where the standard errors are clustered and bootstrapped to 
account for the panel nature of the data and the generated regressors. In addition, using OLS also does not alter 
the conclusions drawn from Table 1. 
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with replacement) and puts them through the multiple stage-procedure.  * indicates 
significance level (p-value) below 0.10, ** below 0.05 and *** below 0.01.  
 
4.2 Earnings and optimism 
Table 2 reports the key findings, namely those for the earnings model set out in equation 
(7). The first column of Table 2 reports results for the self-employed (those previously futures) 
using the Tobit estimator because of the earnings left-censoring issue noted earlier. In the 
second column the earnings model for nevers in the second half of their panel presence is 
reported. This is estimated by OLS with earnings in levels. Paid employment earnings functions 
are usually estimated in semi-log form to allow for distributional skewness. However, the 
purpose here is to provide meaningful comparison with the self-employed. In the third column 
the differential effect of optimism on self-employment and paid-employment earnings is 
formally investigated. Specifically, the results from a Tobit estimator that pools the self-
employed and employee sub-samples are reported, imposing the restriction of a common 
coefficient on each of the control variables across the two sub-groups.  
The effect of optimism on earnings is significantly positive for employees, negative for 
the self-employed and the difference between the groups is highly significant statistically. 
Importantly, the inclusion of the prior earnings control (the individual fixed-effect from the 
prior paid-employment earnings equation, in Table A3) means that the coefficients on time-
invariant intrinsic optimism in Table 2 measure differential effects of the variable in paid and 
self-employment, or, in the case of nevers, early versus later career effects. Specifically, if 
optimism affects earnings as an employee, this effect is captured by the inclusion of first-stage 
earnings fixed effects. The self-employment optimism coefficient in Table 2 therefore 
measures how optimism as an employee boosts or limits self-employment earnings. The effects 
are not small. For nevers, a one-point increase in standardized optimism is associated with an 
increase in monthly earnings of £48 (An increase of 2.8% when evaluated at mean employee 
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earnings). For futures, a one-point increase in optimism is associated with reduced monthly 
self-employed earnings of £283 (A reduction of 20.5% when evaluated at mean self-employed 
earnings). Moreover, the self-employment earnings of those with optimism below the mean 
exceed those with above average optimism by 32%, controlling for other characteristics. The 
results from the pooled Tobit regression are also in line with these conclusions. A one-point 
increase in the standardized optimism score lowers (increases) earnings by £239.37 (£37.84) 
for the self-employed (employees), with the difference being statistically significant at the 1% 
level.25 
Table 2: Optimism and earnings 
Dependent Variable Gross Monthly Earnings (in £’s) 
Estimator (1) Tobit (2) OLS (3) Tobit 
Sample Self-Employed Employee Pooled 
Variable 
Coef. 
(std. err.) 
Coef. 
(std. err.) 
Coef. 
(std. err.) 
Standardized Optimism (?̂?𝑖) -282.50** 
(143.40) 
 
48.10** 
(22.56) 
 
-239.37*** 
(88.67) 
 
Employee 
  
743.80*** 
(80.82) 
 
Employee*Optimism 
  
277.20*** 
(89.03) 
 
Observations 1,964 25,537 27,501 
Mean of Dependent Variable £1381.5 £1733.9 £1708.8 
Note: The estimated standard errors in parenthesis are clustered and bootstrapped to account 
for the panel nature of the data and the fact that ?̂?𝑖,  𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖 and  𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 are 
generated, rather than observed. A bootstrap procedure is used involving 500 repetitions 
which draws bootstrap samples from the clusters (random samples with replacement) and puts 
them through the multiple stage-procedure. * indicates significance level (p-value) below 0.10, 
** below 0.05 and *** below 0.01. The regressions also include additional controls for whether 
the respondent draws up profit and loss accounts (column 1 only), prior performance controls, 
age in quadratic form, gender, marital status and household composition, health, educational 
attainment, housing tenure, parental background in self-employment, hours worked per week, 
employment tenure and whether the respondent is holding a second job.  The regressions all 
include a series of one-digit industry dummy variables, and a set of year and region of residence 
dummy variables. Columns (1) and (3) have 137 left censored observations at gross monthly 
                                                          
25 For robustness, the analysis in Table 2 is redone with the generated variables, standardized optimism, past 
earnings and past realizations (i.e. the generated regressors) replaced by the respective raw individual time-
averaged financial forecast error, log hourly real wage and financial realization over the relevant period. Results 
are similar to those reported in Table 2.  
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earnings ≤ 0. From column (3) the effect of optimism on earnings for employees is £37.84, 
which is statistically significant at approximately the 10% level. Full estimates are reported in 
Table A5 of the Appendix. 
 
These findings are consistent with expectations involving both rational and 
psychological elements. To the extent that the optimism measure captures temporary negative 
income shocks, it will be associated with improved subsequent performance.26 This is likely to 
be the main effect in paid employment. To the extent that measured optimism reflects 
systematic psychological bias, entry errors arise, imparting a negative relationship between 
optimism and self-employment earnings.27 The self-employment finding might also reflect 
optimists being relatively less successful at running businesses compared to experience as 
employees. As optimists potentially take their operating decisions based on false information, 
this could lead to lower earnings. If this is the case, then realists should do best. Earnings would 
then not be monotonic in optimism. Unreported results, which estimate self-employment 
earnings with the inclusion of quadratic and cubic optimism effects, fail to find significant 
higher order terms in optimism. This suggests that optimism does not affect operating 
performance. 
 
As Table A5 looks at second-phase earnings controlling for first-phase earnings, time 
invariant characteristics are only significant for employees to the extent that their impact 
changes through time or first-period temporary shocks are important. In the case of the self-
employed, effects are also possible because different characteristics matter in the two 
employment modes. It is notable that relative to initial earnings, men earn more than women 
but the difference is greatest for the self-employed. Taken in conjunction with the Table 1 result 
                                                          
 26 Possibly the optimists work harder, overestimating the earnings effect 
27 Including graduate/optimism interaction does not yield significant coefficients suggesting optimism effects are 
not restricted to the unsophisticated. 
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that men are more likely to be self-employed, the gender gap arguably suggests that men may 
have a comparative advantage in self-employment. The association between earnings and 
university/college education, are much stronger for employees than for the self-employed. This 
is similar to previous research (see Le, 1999; Parker, 2009). Although some previous research 
has observed parental background effects, there is no particularly significant association in 
these data between self-employment earnings and family background in self-employment. 
Table 1 does find that parents self-employed increases the probability of self-employment so 
this may reflect inheritance rather than comparative advantage. Holding a second job reduces 
earnings significantly for both groups, and in quantitative terms particularly for the self-
employed. Business start-up tends to be a time-consuming activity, and although holding a 
second job will provide some degree of insurance against failure it will also reduce earnings 
capacity. 
 
 
5. Optimism, Divorce and Smoking 
 
If the financial optimism measure captures an innate psychological trait, then it should 
be correlated with outcomes beyond the narrowly economic. As a test of validity, results are 
provided for a context involving rather similar issues - the relationship between optimism 
marriage and divorce. Viewed from the perspective of search theory, marriage has something 
in common with entry into self-employment (Shimer and Smith, 2000). The issue is to decide 
when a sufficiently good prospect has arrived. The optimism perspective is captured by the 
adage “marry in haste, repent at leisure”. Optimists may overestimate match quality, eventually 
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realise that the marriage is a mistake, and are therefore more likely to divorce.28 To test this, 
we compare the optimism - measured as the five-point difference between forecast and 
realization - of those who are currently married and who never divorce within the period 
covered by the dataset (non-divorcees) with those who are currently married but  divorce later 
in the panel (future-divorcees). We also include a series of dummy variables to capture the year 
of divorce, divorced status, year of remarriage (should this occur) and for remarried status. The 
results of this optimism equation are reported in the first column of Table A6. Married 
individuals who will divorce in the future are more optimistic than the married who never 
divorce. It could be argued that the difference is due to unlucky negative income shocks 
triggering divorce rather than intrinsic optimism. To counter this, two further equations are 
estimated. One examines whether these two groups differ in their financial forecasts and a 
parallel equation examines whether they differ in terms of their financial realizations. The 
respective results are presented in columns 2 and 3 of Table A6. The two-equation procedure 
makes it possible to reject the negative shock interpretation. Specifically, future-divorcees have 
significantly higher expectations, so an optimism effect cannot just be the result of income 
collapse. The final element is that future-divorcees have slightly higher financial realizations 
than non-divorcees, but the difference is not statistically significant. So it can be concluded that 
prior intrinsic optimism is associated with divorce.  
 
As a further validity check, these equations also reveal that smokers have very 
significantly higher financial optimism. Although increased smoking is associated with lower 
financial realizations, at a marginal level of significance, optimism is not just the result of low 
income. Heavy smokers also have significantly higher financial expectations than those who 
                                                          
28 Optimists might overrate their own attractiveness and therefore wait longer to get married. Nevertheless, 
matches based on one party overestimating their worth are also likely to be unsatisfactory and therefore more 
likely to terminate. 
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do not smoke, given the same observables. Financial optimists tend to assume the worst will 
not happen. This psychology appears to transfer to the consequences of smoking suggesting 
that the optimism measure does at least partially capture a psychological trait.    
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper tests whether the equilibrium relationships implied by selection into self-
employment on optimism hold in the earnings data, in particular, that intrinsic optimism leads 
to mistaken entry into self-employment. Higher intrinsic optimism is therefore associated with 
lower self-employment earnings. Measured optimism is a compound of psychological bias and 
bad luck. In the latter case, optimism in the past implies higher future income. A negative 
relation between self-employment earnings and optimism therefore indicates the presence of a 
selection effect. For those continuing in paid employment, intrinsic optimism should not enter 
the second phase earnings function if past earnings are controlled for. The reason is that 
intrinsic optimism should have similar effects in all periods. This just leaves the luck effect, 
which imparts a positive optimism effect. The difference in the optimism coefficients between 
the two earnings regressions is good evidence that selection on optimism influences self-
employment earnings.  
The negative correlation between optimism and self-employment earnings could be a 
treatment rather than a selection effect. Optimism may directly affect performance in ways that 
are absent in salaried employment. Perhaps the self-employed have more discretion than 
employees and therefore it is more important that their decisions are based on a realistic 
appraisal of alternatives. An implication of optimism lowering productivity is that realists 
would do best, but self-employment earnings are monotonically decreasing in optimism. Even 
if optimism has a treatment effect, optimists can hardly recognise this, so excessive entry is 
still implied.  
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As always, the patterns found could be the result of omitted variable bias. For example, 
apart from optimism, there are no other psychological controls in our earnings equation. It is 
possible that our optimism measure is acting as a proxy for something else. Two papers that 
experimentally examine the correlation between optimism/overconfidence and other 
psychological traits find little connection (Dean and Orteleva, 2016; Stango, Yoong, and 
Zinman, 2016). In principle, there could be some variable other than intrinsic optimism that is 
correlated with forecast earnings and has opposite effects on second-phase paid and self-
employment earnings but no candidate comes to mind. 
Recent debate has been critical of entrepreneurship policy, arguing that it can be poorly 
designed and confused with active labour market policy (Shane, 2009). To the extent that 
optimism leads to entry by those whose comparative advantage is not in entrepreneurship, this 
paper complements these concerns.  
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APPENDIX: 
Table A1: First-phase summary statistics by second-phase employment status  
 
Futures Nevers 
Variable Mean/ 
Frequency 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean/ 
Frequenc
y 
Std. Dev. 
Financial Forecasting and Earnings:     
Financial Forecast (t): (3-point scale. 
“Worse off” to “Better off”. -1/0/+1) 
0.324*** 0.633 0.287 0.633 
Financial Realization (t+1): (3-point 
scale. “Worse off” to “Better off”. -
1/0/+1) 
0.155 0.764 0.160 0.757 
Financial Realization (t): (3-point scale. 
“Worse off” to “Better off”. -1/0/+1) 
0.181 0.775 0.182 0.766 
Forecast Error: (5-point scale. Forecast 
(t)  minus Realization (t+1)) 
0.169*** 0.871 0.127 0.849 
     
Gross monthly earnings (in £’s) 1552.79*** 1209.42 1235.09 852.38 
     
Demographics:     
Age (years) 35.52*** 10.02 34.84 10.53 
Male 0.634***  0.492  
Marital Status and Household 
Composition:  
    
Single, never married 0.206***  0.229  
Widowed/divorced/ separated 0.055*  0.063  
Married/cohabiting partner employed 0.607  0.611  
Married/cohabiting partner not 
employed  
0.131***  0.097  
Number of dependent children in 
household  
0.707 0.983 0.708 0.968 
     
Highest Educational Attainment:     
University/college degree 0.175***  0.157  
HND/HNC - vocational college 
qualifications 
0.088**  0.076  
A-level 0.268***  0.210  
O-levels/GCSEs 0.315***  0.382  
No qualifications 0.154***  0.175  
Housing Tenure:     
Outright owner 0.100  0.102  
Own with mortgage 0.736***  0.695  
Private sector rental 0.089  0.092  
Social sector rental 
 
0.075***  0.111  
 Observations 3138  28830  
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(618 individuals) (7367 individuals) 
Note: Not all variables are recorded for all individuals. Only individuals with at least some 
observations for all variables are included. The difference between the means/frequencies of 
futures and nevers is tested with * indicating significance level below 0.10, ** below 0.05 and 
*** below 0.01. Educational attainment is measured through a series of dummy variables 
indicating the highest level of attainment. These are: university or college degree level at 
undergraduate or postgraduate level; HND (Higher National Diplomas) and HNC (Higher 
National Certificates) which are work-related, or vocational, higher education qualifications; 
A-levels or equivalent (post-compulsory examinations taken at 18 as qualifying exams for 
college or university entrance); GCSE or O-levels (age 16 schooling attainment qualifications); 
and no formal qualifications. 
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Table A2: OLS fixed-effect optimism and realization equations 
Dependent Variable Forecast Error Realization t+1 
Variable Coef. Std. err Coef. Std. err 
Demographics:      
Age  -0.032 0.027 -0.005 0.022 
Age²/100 -0.002 0.015  0.056*** 0.013 
Marital Status and Household 
Composition (Reference: 
Single, never married)     
Widowed/divorced/separated -0.058 0.055  0.055 0.047 
Married/cohabiting-partner 
employed  0.001 0.034  0.010 0.030 
Married/cohabiting-partner not 
employed -0.021 0.042  0.064* 0.037 
Number of dependent children 
in household   0.037*** 0.014  0.009 0.012 
Highest Educational 
Attainment  (Reference: No 
qualifications)     
University/college degree  0.079 0.146  0.036 0.125 
HND/HNC - vocational college 
qualification  -0.027 0.140  0.061 0.117 
A-level -0.091 0.112  0.073 0.101 
O-levels/GCSEs -0.027 0.114  0.058 0.104 
Housing Tenure (Reference: 
Social sector rental)     
Outright owner  0.057 0.054 -0.131*** 0.046 
Own with mortgage  0.088* 0.043 -0.089** 0.037 
Private sector rental  0.093* 0.048 -0.058 0.041 
Financial  Realizations (t) 
(Reference: ‘Worse off’)     
‘Better off’  0.136*** 0.017 -0.117*** 0.014 
‘Same’ -0.001 0.016 -0.065*** 0.013 
Region Controls Yes  Yes  
Year (survey wave) Controls Yes  Yes  
Observations 31968 
(7985 Individuals) 
31968 
(7985 Individuals) 
F Test 7.07*** 6.28*** 
Note: All regressions are clustered by individual and include year and region of residence 
dummy variables (coefficients not reported). * indicates significance level (p-value) below 
0.10, ** below 0.05 and *** below 0.01.  
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Table A3: OLS fixed-effect log hourly real wage equation  
Dependent Variable Log Hourly Real Wage 
Variable Coef. Std. err 
Demographics:   
Age  0.071*** 0.008 
Age²/100 -0.104*** 0.005 
Marital Status and Household Composition 
(Reference: Single, never married) 
  
Widowed/divorced/separated  0.046*** 0.017 
Married/cohabiting-partner employed  0.055*** 0.011 
Married/cohabiting-partner not employed  0.069*** 0.013 
Number of dependent children in household  -0.020*** 0.005 
Health (Reference: Health-other)   
Health-excellent  0.000 0.006 
Health-good  0.002 0.005 
Highest Educational Attainment (Reference: No 
qualifications) 
  
University/college degree  0.173*** 0.050 
HND/HNC - vocational college qualification   0.098** 0.047 
A-level  0.071* 0.041 
O-levels/GCSEs -0.008 0.037 
Labour Market Characteristics:   
Union covered, member  0.066*** 0.010 
Union covered, non-member  0.015* 0.008 
Holding a second job -0.022** 0.009 
Job tenure  0.000 0.001 
Job tenure²  0.004 0.005 
Manager / supervisor  0.042*** 0.006 
Promotion opportunities available  0.004 0.005 
Pay includes bonus / profit share  0.031*** 0.005 
Employer provided pension available  0.070*** 0.008 
Pay includes annual rises  0.015*** 0.005 
Shift worker  0.017* 0.010 
Seasonal/Agency Temping/Casual contract -0.023 0.017 
Fixed-term contact -0.009 0.016 
Flexibility in Job Location (Reference: Work at 
employers’ premises) 
  
Work from home  0.129*** 0.048 
Other work location  0.012 0.010 
Work needs travelling  0.022** 0.010 
Occupation (Reference: Other)   
Managers & Administrators  0.116*** 0.017 
Professional   0.132*** 0.018 
Associate Professional & Technical   0.088*** 0.017 
Clerical & Secretarial   0.048*** 0.017 
Craft & Related  0.044** 0.017 
Personal & Protective Service -0.018 0.018 
Sales -0.004 0.019 
Plant & Machine Operatives  0.036** 0.017 
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Employing Sector (Reference: Private Firm)   
Civil Service -0.010 0.020 
Local Government  0.031* 0.017 
Other Public -0.006 0.015 
Non-Profit -0.002 0.024 
One-digit Level Industry (Reference: Agriculture & 
Fishing) 
  
Mining & Quarrying  0.136*** 0.049 
Manufacturing  0.060* 0.031 
Electricity, Gas & Water  0.088* 0.047 
Construction  0.046 0.034 
Wholesale & Retail Trade -0.017 0.032 
Hotels & Restaurants -0.066* 0.034 
Transport, Storage & Communication  0.016 0.034 
Financial Intermediation  0.049 0.036 
Real Estate & Business Activities  0.053* 0.032 
Public Administration & Defence  0.059* 0.032 
Education  0.036 0.036 
Health & Social Work -0.022 0.033 
Social & Personal Services -0.013 0.034 
Private Households & Extra-Territorial 
Organizations 
 0.060 0.038 
Firm Size -Number of Co-workers (Reference: Over 
500) 
  
1-9 -0.070*** 0.010 
10-24 -0.048*** 0.010 
25-49 -0.039*** 0.010 
50-99 -0.021** 0.010 
100-199 -0.016* 0.009 
200-499 -0.005 0.007 
Region Controls Yes  
Year (survey wave) Controls Yes  
Observations 36391 
(9718 Individuals) 
F Test 47.87*** 
Note: The regression is clustered by individual and includes year and region of residence 
dummy variables (coefficients not reported). * indicates significance level (p-value) below 
0.10, ** below 0.05 and *** below 0.01.  
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Table A4: Second-phase summary statistics by employment status. 
 Self-Employed Employee 
Variable 
Mean/Median/ 
Frequency 
Std. Dev. Mean/Median/   
Frequency 
Std. Dev. 
Gross monthly earnings (in 
£’s):     
Mean  1381.48*** 2389.04 1733.92 1241.79 
25th percentile  291.67***   958.75   
50th percentile  833.33***  1499.15   
75th percentile 1583.33***  2208.33  
90th percentile 3031.00  3097.38  
95th percentile 
 
4583.33*** 
 
3788.92 
 
Whether Draws up Profit/Loss 
Accounts:      
Draws up accounts 0.823  -  
Does not draw up accounts 0.089 -  
Not yet but will be 0.089  -  
Health:      
Health-excellent 0.267*  0.250  
Health-good 0.496  0.509  
Health-other 0.237 0.241  
Demographics:     
Age (years) 42.48 10.01 42.36 10.58 
Male 0.686***  0.482  
Marital Status and Household 
Composition:     
Single, never married 0.100***  0.135  
Widowed/divorced/separated 0.060***  0.090  
Married/cohabiting, partner 
employed 0.690***  0.661  
Married/cohabiting, partner 
not employed 0.150***  0.113  
Number of dependent children 
in household 0.824*** 1.063 0.622 0.916 
Highest Educational 
Attainment:     
University/college degree 0.157***  0.181  
HND/HNC - vocational 
college qualification  0.087  0.078  
A-levels 0.261***  0.216  
O-levels/GCSEs 0.314***  0.363  
No qualifications 0.181**  0.163  
Housing Tenure:     
Outright owner 0.183  0.173  
Own with mortgage 0.693  0.678  
Private sector rental 0.075  0.068  
Social sector rental 0.048***  0.081  
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Parental  Background at Age 
14:     
Both parents self-employed 0.034***  0.012  
Father self-employed 0.159***  0.103  
Mother self-employed 0.029**  0.021  
Neither parent self-employed 0.778***  0.864  
Labour Market 
Characteristics:     
Job tenure (years) 3.98*** 4.64 5.68 6.56 
Usual hours worked per week 43.73*** 16.41 34.56 9.59 
Holding a second job 0.095***  0.072  
Observations 1964  
(559 individuals) 
25537 
(6057 individuals) 
Note: The table comprises individuals included in Table A1 with at least some observations for 
all characteristics shown. Differences in the medians/means/frequencies between the self-
employed and employees are tested with * indicating significance level below 0.10, ** below 
0.05 and *** below 0.01. Educational attainment is measured through a series of dummy 
variables indicating the highest level of attainment. These are: university or college degree 
level at undergraduate or postgraduate level; HND (Higher National Diplomas) and HNC 
(Higher National Certificates) which are work-related, or vocational, higher education 
qualifications; A-levels or equivalent (post-compulsory examinations taken at 18 as qualifying 
exams for college or university entrance); GCSE or O-levels (age 16 schooling attainment 
qualifications); and no formal qualifications. Self-employment earnings are computed from a 
monthly self-employment profit variable for self-employed respondents who draw up profit 
and loss accounts, and a monthly self-employed gross pay variable if a self-employed 
respondent does not draw up profit and loss accounts. Dummy variables are shown which 
indicate whether or not the respondent draws up profit and loss accounts, to allow for 
systematic differences in measurement error between the two response types in the earnings 
model. Specifically, respondents are asked: “In the business are annual business accounts 
prepared for the Inland Revenue for tax purposes?”, with the possible responses being “Yes”, 
“No” and “Not yet but will be.” 
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Table A5: Estimation of optimism on gross monthly self-employed and employee 
earnings 
Dependent Variable Gross Monthly Earnings (in £’s) 
Estimator (1) Tobit (2) OLS (3) Tobit 
Sample Self-Employed Employee Pooled 
Variable 
Coef. 
(std. err.) 
Coef. 
(std. err.) 
Coef. 
(std. err.) 
Standardized Optimism (?̂?𝑖) -282.50** 48.10** -239.37*** 
 (143.40) (22.56) (88.67) 
Employee   743.80*** 
   (80.82) 
Employee*Optimism   277.20*** 
   (89.03) 
Draws up accounts -26.23   
 (164.57)   
Not yet but will be 416.20**   
 (204.55)   
Past Earnings (𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖) 980.60*** 1550*** 1467*** 
 (351.76) (64.99) (67.16) 
Past Realizations (𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖) 90.36 146.8*** 137.0*** 
 (173.40) (31.77) (34.95) 
Health-excellent 56.31 76.68*** 70.53*** 
 (183.55) (23.48) (25.76) 
Health-good 58.55 25.78* 26.61 
 (114.25) (15.10) (16.42) 
Age 85.28 115.6*** 112.1*** 
 (64.28) (14.66) (13.75) 
Age² -1.276* -1.521*** -1.479*** 
 (0.71) (0.11) (0.12) 
Male 375.0** 144.0*** 198.3*** 
 (177.89) (24.28) (25.09) 
Widowed/divorced/separated -572.30* 96.29** 68.24 
 (335.58) (44.04) (46.28) 
Married/cohabiting-partner employed -104.50 74.54*** 52.85 
 (305.48) (28.25) (32.36) 
Married/cohabiting-partner not 
employed 
-16.76 233.6*** 209.5*** 
 (336.25) (48.06) (51.42) 
Number of dependent children in 
household 
-97.84 -12.96 -17.29 
 (95.23) (12.92) (15.43) 
University/college degree -134.30 617.5*** 600.6*** 
 (355.48) (83.97) (85.28) 
HND/HNC - vocational college 
qualification 
-92.88 245.2*** 245.9*** 
 (290.42) (85.55) (86.33) 
A-Level -464.1* 93.20 71.41 
 (251.98) (67.85) (68.79) 
O-levels/GCSEs -211.4 -80.16 -80.67 
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 (235.49) (60.63) (63.03) 
Outright owner 298.2 -6.427 8.619 
 (284.37) (32.97) (36.68) 
Own with mortgage 127.1 7.972 29.56 
 (229.28) (24.59) (25.83) 
Private sector rental -185.0 -71.74** -68.34* 
 (262.70) (36.72) (36.39) 
Both parents self-employed 14.30 -25.62 60.34 
 (421.86) (122.44) (121.01) 
Father self-employed 55.81 22.33 22.01 
 (198.57) (41.85) (49.19) 
Mother self-employed -593.1* 32.18 -26.05 
 (398.80) (88.81) (83.03) 
Usual hours worked per week 9.638** 37.64*** 32.27*** 
 (4.36) (1.13) (1.25) 
Job tenure 42.03** -0.788 -0.0849 
 (18.03) (1.33) (1.43) 
Holds a second job -315.3** -89.83*** -124.4*** 
 (136.15) (27.76) (28.10) 
One-digit Industry Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Region Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year (survey wave) Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,964 25,537 27,501 
Wald Chi² 644.57*** 15886.52*** 19981.08*** 
R²  0.5953  
Note: The estimated standard errors in parenthesis are clustered and bootstrapped to account 
for the panel nature of the data and the fact that ?̂?𝑖,  𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖 and  𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖 are 
generated, rather than observed.  A bootstrap procedure is used involving 500 repetitions 
which draws bootstrap samples from the clusters (random samples with replacement) and puts 
them through the multiple stage-procedure. * indicates significance level (p-value) below 0.10, 
** below 0.05 and *** below 0.01. Columns (1) and (3) have 137 left censored observations 
at gross monthly earnings ≤ 0. From column (3) the effect of optimism on earnings for 
employees is £37.84, which is statistically significant at approximately the 10% level.  
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Table A6: Ordered probit regression for forecast error, expectations and realizations  
Dependent Variable Forecast Error  Expectation t Realization t+1 
Column (1) (2) (3) 
Variable 
Coef. Std. 
err  
Coef. Std. 
err  
Coef. Std. err  
Divorce Status (Reference: 
Non-divorcees)       
Future Divorcee 
 
0.103*** 0.033  0.158*** 0.050  0.001 0.038 
Year of divorce  0.141 0.155 -0.192 0.148 -0.341** 0.166 
Divorced 
 
0.087*** 0.025  0.099*** 0.037 -0.026 0.027 
Year of Remarriage -0.056 0.130  0.298* 0.157  0.325** 0.156 
Re-Married  0.063 0.051  0.062 0.054 -0.031 0.047 
Smoker (Number of 
Cigarettes) 
 
0.005*** 0.001  0.006*** 0.001 -0.001* 0.001 
Demographics:        
Age  -0.007 0.006 -0.042*** 0.007 -0.028*** 0.006 
Age²/100  0.000 0.000  0.000*** 0.000  0.000*** 0.000 
Male  0.034** 0.013  0.040** 0.018 -0.009 0.014 
Employment Status 
(Reference: Employee)       
Self-Employed 
 
0.126*** 0.022  0.207*** 0.031  0.012 0.023 
Household Composition        
Number of dependent 
children in household  
 
0.022*** 0.007  0.011 0.009 -0.019*** 0.007 
Highest Educational 
Attainment  (Reference: No 
qualifications)       
University/college degree 
-
0.125*** 0.023 -0.040 0.032  0.120*** 0.025 
HND/HNC - vocational 
college qualification  -0.043 0.028  0.044 0.039  0.085*** 0.030 
A-level -0.018 0.020 -0.008 0.029  0.012 0.022 
O-levels/GCSEs  0.001 0.018  0.018 0.025  0.011 0.019 
Housing Tenure (Reference: 
Social sector rental)       
Outright owner 
-
0.086*** 0.029 -0.207*** 0.038 -0.058** 0.030 
Own with mortgage -0.035 0.025 -0.052 0.032  0.001 0.026 
Private sector rental -0.015 0.037 -0.018 0.048  0.004 0.039 
Financial  Realizations (t) 
(Reference: ‘Worse off’)       
‘Better off’ 
-
0.337*** 0.017  0.464*** 0.023  0.790*** 0.020 
‘Same’ 
-
0.301*** 0.015 -0.009 0.020  0.365*** 0.017 
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Region Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year (survey wave) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 41289 (5676 Individuals) 
Log Likelihood -48832.9 -35064.0 -41274.2 
chi²   1099.4*** 1937.5*** 2823.8*** 
Pseudo R² 0.014 0.044 0.046 
 
Note: All regressions are clustered by individual and include year and region of residence 
dummy variables (coefficients not reported). * indicates significance level (p-value) below 
0.10, ** below 0.05 and *** below 0.01.   
 
